Changing management accounting systems requires more than appropriate implementation. It is argued that structural characteristics of an organization, centralization in particular, should also be taken into account when deciding on a change. Centralization implies higher costs of communication because the decision-maker has to obtain information from organizational participants who have incentives to in ‡uence the decision. A limit on communication reduces in ‡uence costs but at the same time it also lowers the quality of the decision. As a result of that, centralized organizations (i) will implement changes in their accounting systems less often than decentralized ones (ii) will more often implement top-down, i.e. ignore local information.
Introduction
This study contributes to the literature that seeks to understand when and why organizations introduce changes in their management accounting systems (MAS).
In prior work addressing the question, two domains have been prominent -technical merit of a particular technique (e.g., Hughes, 1994, Banker and Johnston, 1993) and implementation issues (e.g., Swenson, 1997, Shields, 1995) .
We emphasize the importance of an additional domain and argue that organizational design has implications for changing MAS of a …rm. Organizational design implies a …rm speci…c distribution of incentives, information and decision rights (Zimmerman, 1997) . These structural factors are potentially the major cause of organizational resistance to a MAS change. Implementation process factors (e.g., clear objectives, training of users) may play a secondary role. Adequate implementation may alleviate resistance but cannot remove the underlying structural cause (Markus and Pfe¤er, 1983) . Recent empirical research provides evidence that is in line with this argument (Anderson and Young, 1999; Gosselin, 1997) .
We model the e¤ect of centralization 1 -one of the key organization design factorson the process of MAS change. Centralization has probably been the most prominent structural factor in the empirical work studying MAS design and changes (Gosselin, 1997; Libby and Waterhouse, 1996; Gul and Chia, 1994; Chenhall and Morris, 1986) .
Additionally, there is extensive theoretical work on centralization (Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Baiman and Rajan, 1995; Melumad and Reichelstein, 1987) highlighting its importance in organizational design.
The decision to adopt and implement a MAS change is analyzed in a framework drawing on the lobbying literature (Che and Gale, 1998) . The decision-maker has to obtain information on the value of the MAS change from organizational participants who will be a¤ected by the change. Communication with them is both costly and in-1
In line with the literature, we de…ne centralization as the extent to which authority is con…ned to higher levels of the hierarchy. Decentralization entails delegation of authority.
formative. The communication costs in centralized organizations, where the distance between the decision-maker and those who have the information is larger, are higher than in decentralized organizations. Given this assumption, we derive that centralized organizations will optimally implement fewer MAS changes and implement top-down (ignoring local information) more often than decentralized organizations.
The rest of this section provides more detail and an example of the problem we want to address. In subsection 1.1, we argue that an important distinction between centralized and decentralized structures arises due to communication costs. Subsection 1.2 shows that MAS change will give rise to extraordinary communication costs due to in ‡uencing activities. Section 2 presents a model that captures the core of the problem and section 3 derives implications of the model. We discuss them and conclude in the last section.
Centralization and costs of communication
Centralization implies communication costs because knowledge has to be transferred to the person who has decision rights. Under decentralization the decision rights are transferred to the person who has the knowledge, which gives rise to agency costs (Christie et al., 1992) . The trade-o¤ between agency and communication costs determines the optimal level of centralization. A key insight of the theoretical literature is that when the revelation principle (Myerson, 1982) applies, a centralized structure will always (at least weakly) outperform delegation in solving the agency problems (Melumad et al., 1997) . Within that framework, one cannot explain why delegation is such a common arrangement in practice. That is why recent theories depart from the assumptions of the revelation principle. The assumption of costless communication seems to be an obvious target. Melumad et al. (1997 Melumad et al. ( , 1992 solve the incentive problem with an exogenous restriction on communication and contracting. They show that when communication is limited, delegation dominates centralization.
Similarly, the starting point of our analysis is that communication costs can be reduced by delegation of authority. Rather than looking for the optimal degree of centralization, our study points out the implications of di¤erent degrees of centralization for the process of MAS change. The interesting aspect of the question is that we can no longer assume that communication is a routine information exchange.
MAS themselves are the routine information technology, that's why any MAS change will be a special event with a nontrivial communication problem. The next section describes it in more detail.
MAS change and Cost of Communication
MAS are an established information technology and there are multiple users of MAS output. Consequently, MAS design is a result of compromising di¤erent information demands. In our setting, it is important to recognize that managers at higher levels of a hierarchy will have di¤erent information needs than managers at lower levels.
The following example based on a real problem of a company 2 illustrates the con ‡ict that arises when a MAS change is considered.
A large multinational …rm producing consumer goods has several operating companies in most major European markets. The …rm focuses on a single line of business but production lists of its companies di¤er widely. Each company produces a di¤erent number of products and has a di¤erent mixture of local and European brands.
The …rm was concerned with production e¢ciency in some companies and planned to reorganize the production of its European brands. The …rm launched a …rm-wide benchmarking program. To be able to rely on accurate products cost information, the …rm decided to implement activity-based costing (ABC) in all of its companies. The ABC project met with resistance in some companies. They argued that ABC will not bring anything to them because they either produce very few product items (i.e. cost allocations are not a major issue) or focus mainly on local brands that will not be a¤ected by the reorganization. Still, to assure comparability of cost information, these companies were asked to switch to the ABC system. Its name and further details are con…dential and cannot be presented here.
The example illustrates the need for comparable cost information at higher management levels. It also points out that local information needs are company-speci…c (dependent on cost structure, product portfolio) and have to be compromised sometimes.
Many MAS changes are likely to be subject to a similar con ‡ict. On the one hand, there is the essential demand of high level managers for uniformity of MAS, on the other, there are speci…c needs of local users whose opinions on a MAS change may di¤er greatly. Preserving the uniformity of MAS requires that bene…ts from a change for some users be traded-o¤ against costs that the change imposes on others.
Moreover, only users themselves know the magnitude of these bene…ts or costs. This is why the previous section described MAS changes as special events with a non-trivial communication problem. The decision-maker has to obtain information from parties who will be a¤ected by the decision. Milgrom (1988) and Milgrom and Roberts (1988) point out that this creates incentives for in ‡uence activities.
There are several analytical structures that model in ‡uence activities within an organization 3 . Moreover, the problem of information exchange with interested parties has been dealt with in the lobbying literature (e.g., Lohmann, 1995; Potters and Van Winden, 1992 ) . A large part of this work (e.g., Che and Gale, 1998; Baye et al., 1993) applies analytical models that are closely related to auction theory (e.g., La¤ont and Robert, 1996; Amann and Leininger, 1996) . The common feature of this literature is a setting in which two or more agents compete for one good. The core problem is how to design a mechanism that would be optimal given the preferences of the mechanism designer. As the lobbying literature points out, the same problem occurs when a decision that a¤ects the utility of the agents is to be taken. They have an incentive to spend resources on in ‡uencing the decision, which may be socially wasteful.
3 Schae¤er (1998) applies the concept of in ‡uence costs to organizational change, Rottenberg and Saloner (1995) model the interfunctional con ‡ict within organizations, Bagwell and Zechner (1993) and Meyer et al. (1992) analyze the relationship between headquarters and divisions and divestiture activities.
We apply these insights to learn more about the organizational process of MAS change. Besides that, we contribute to the underlying analytical literature in two ways. First, we extend the framework analyzing the e¤ect of a limit on the lobbyists' contributions (Che and Gale, 1998 ). In our model, it is possible to derive the optimal limit endogenously by explicitly modeling the preferences and information of the decision-maker. Second, drawing on the in ‡uence cost literature, we …nd a way to incorporate information bene…ts of lobbying into the widely used auction-based models.
Analytical Framework
This section presents the analytical framework we use to address the research question: what is the e¤ect of centralization on the process of MAS change. Subsection 2.1 discusses the assumptions of our model, which we describe in more detail in subsections 2.2, 2.3 and present its equilibrium in 2.4. Finally, we check the robustness of the results by modifying the information structure of the model in subsection 2.5.
Assumptions
The assumptions below underlie the analysis: Assumption 1. The impact of a MAS change is not distributed evenly across departments in a …rm.
Decision-making bene…ts from any accounting change are situation speci…c. They depend on factors that vary across departments, such as cost structure, management style, etc. Hence, we can assume that MAS change would increase pro…ts in one department, while it would not be worth the costs in another.
Assumption 2. It is not possible to restrict implementation to only those departments that can bene…t from the MAS change.
Whenever there are multiple business units (functional departments) in a …rm, MAS uniformity becomes an essential prerequisite for planning and control. Performance measures, benchmarking or limited processing capacity at higher levels requires standardization of internal reporting and MAS practices. The accounting literature provides numerous examples of situations when corporate headquarters imposed an accounting technique on the divisions, even though it limited their ability to use MAS as a support for local decision-making (Jones, 1992; Colignon and Covaleski, 1988; Jones, 1985) . Therefore we assume that MAS changes cannot be implemented only in the business units (functional departments) that can bene…t from it.
Assumption 3. The degree of centralization and compensation are not adjusted to re ‡ect speci…c circumstances of a MAS change. Anderson and Young (1999) and Shields (1995) …nd that performance evaluation and compensation are not altered to create a link with ABC implementation. We suggest the following explanation. Compensation and delegation of authority are essential building blocks of organizational design. These building blocks are put in place for a long period of time and require stability (Foster and Ward, 1994) . Altering them to address short term issues, such as MAS change implementation, would have adverse long term consequences. Thus, we assume that the design elements are una¤ected by a particular MAS change. This does not preclude the possibility that they were ex-ante chosen in a way that re ‡ected the expected impact of future MAS changes.
Assumption 4. Transfer of knowledge from the agents to the principal is more costly in a more centralized environment.
In a decentralized organization, the decision-maker is close to the people who possess relevant information. It is relatively inexpensive to obtain it as the decisionmaker has enough knowledge to understand the information, and recognize that it is relevant and true. In centralized organizations, decision rights are located at higher organizational levels. The distance between the decision-maker and the level where information is present becomes larger. As a consequence, lower level managers have to report the information through a more costly process. This observation is in line with McAfee and McMillan (1995) , and Jensen and Meckling (1992) .
Basic Model
To address our research question, we model the interactions of a principal and two agents. The principal (she) is the decision-maker who is responsible for MAS design.
The agents are two competing departments within the …rm. Agent 1 (he) is in favor of the change, agent 2 (he) is against it (assumption 1 and 2). Each agent knows what the change implies for his department's contribution to …rm's pro…tability, µ i (i = 1; 2). Let µ 1 be the increase in the pro…t of agent's 1 department due to the change and µ 2 the decrease in the pro…t of agent's 2 department (the costs of the change are higher than its bene…ts for this department). For the principal, µ i is a realization of £ i , a stochastic variable with a uniform distribution on the interval [0,1].
£ 1 and £ 2 are independent. The agents may or may not have better information than the principal about the opponent's type. Therefore, we compare two complementary cases. In what follows, we …rst assume that the agents know as much as the principal about the opponent's type, i.e. the distribution of £ i only. Second, in section 2.5 we consider the case where the agents have perfect information about the opponent's type, while the principal still knows only the distribution of the types.
Following the empirical literature (Krumwiede, 1998; Gosselin, 1997) , we distinguish two di¤erent stages of the change process: adoption and implementation. The adoption stage refers to information gathering and evaluating whether the suggested MAS change is suitable for the …rm. During the implementation stage the initial idea of MAS change translates into its practical realization. Implementation is contingent upon the information collected in the adoption stage. The principal decides …rst on adoption of the change: A = 1; if the change is adopted, = 0; if the change is not adopted.
A positive adoption decision (A = 1) allows the agents to search for relevant information and to present it to the principal. Depending on the information they provide during this stage, the principal decides whether to implement. For A = 1, we de…ne:
If I = 1; agent 1 can increase his department's pro…t by µ 1 . If I = 0; agent 2 can prevent a decrease of µ 2 . Both agents can exert in ‡uencing e¤ort e 1 and e 2 to persuade the principal to make their favored decision. The in ‡uencing e¤ort will result into some departmental in ‡uence costs,
To simplify notation, we assume
Thus, the agent's pay-o¤s are:
Risk aversion is not central to our problem, therefore we assume that agents are risk neutral, i.e. they maximize their expected pay-o¤ (see (12) in appendix). Note that compensation does not a¤ect the agent's pay-o¤s in the game as it is invariable in the process of MAS change (assumption 3). An additional implicit assumption is that the existing compensation plan provides incentives to maximize departmental pro…t.
The principal is also risk neutral, i.e. when making the adoption and implementation decisions, she maximizes expected …rm pro…ts. If she refuses to adopt the change (A = 0), the game ends and all players receive zero as a payo¤. By adopting (A = 1), the principal opens communication channels with the agents. Their in ‡uencing efforts are informative but also costly. The principal incurs …xed adoption costs, C A .
Moreover, the agents' in ‡uencing e¤orts, e i (i = 1; 2), cause organizational in ‡uence costs, C(e 1 ; e 2 ; c): The parameter c re ‡ects the degree of centralization. It is higher for more centralized organizations (assumption 4). The principal can reduce C(e 1 ; e 2 ; c)
by approving a limited amount of time or money to be spent on searching for and presenting of information 4 . Let us denote this limit on e i as L: (The in ‡uencing e¤ort is a function of the agents' types and the limit, e i (µ i ; L): In what follows, e i denotes also realizations of this function.)
After the adoption stage, the principal decides on implementation. She can revise the adoption decision and reject the implementation (I = 0). If she implements, the …rm's pro…ts change by µ 1 ¡ µ 2 . Formally, her pay-o¤ is:
where B(I); MAS change value, and C(e 1 ; e 2 ; c); organizational in ‡uence costs, are de…ned as follows:
C(e 1 ; e 2 ; c) = c(e 1 + e 2 ) 2 :
The de…nition of C(e 1 ; e 2 ; c) re ‡ects that the in ‡uencing e¤ort has di¤erent implications for an agent and for the principal, i.e. the …rm as a whole. As the total amount of time spent on in ‡uencing increases, negative externalities related to it accumulate increasingly. Excessive in ‡uencing results in a preoccupation with internal problems and organizational politics, which is detrimental to the performance. Moreover, this problem is especially severe for centralized organizations Burns and Waterhouse, 1975) , which is captured in the de…nition by c:
The in ‡uencing e¤orts, e i ; cause organizational in ‡uence costs but reveal information as well. Depending on his e¤ort, each agent produces some amount of messages, m i (e i ), in favor or against the change. To simplify the problem, we assume m i (e i ) = e i . Thus, having observed e 1 and e 2 the principal can revise her expectations of the MAS change value and, if necessary, revise the adoption decision.
4
The idea of restricting in ‡uencing e¤orts is similar to Milgrom and Roberts (1988) who argue that a solution to avoid in ‡uence costs is to close the communication channel.
Time line and solution concept
The previous section described the basic building blocks of the game. Here, we …rst summarize it in a time line and then introduce the solution concept.
The principal
The agents The principal 2) Having observed L, the agents simultaneously determine their in ‡uencing e¤ort e 1 and e 2 . They know their own type and the distribution of the opponent's type.
3) Having observed e 1 and e 2 , the principal makes her …nal decision on implementation. She can revise her adoption decision and reject the change. All payo¤s are realized and the game ends.
We can apply backward induction to solve the game. The principal's implementation strategy in the third move depends on the agents' strategies in the second move.
On the other hand, the agents' strategies depend not only on the L chosen in the …rst move but also on how the principal decides on the implementation in the third move.
In equilibrium, all players will correctly predict the optimal strategies of the other parties. Therefore, we …rst look for a Baysian Nash equilibrium (see, e.g., Mas-Colell et al., 1995) of the subgame that consists of the second and third moves of the overall game, given a …xed L: Second, knowing the equilibrium strategies of the principal and the agents given a …xed L, we look for the optimal L in the …rst move.
Results
Given that L was chosen in the …rst move, denote by I ¤ (L) the equilibrium implementation strategy of the principal in the third move: Further, denote e ¤ i (L) as the equilibrium in ‡uencing e¤ort of the agents in the second move. It is a function of both µ i and L but we omit the former argument so as to save notation:
The following proposition describes the equilibrium strategies in the subgame (moves 2, 3):
Proposition 1 Given a limit L on the agents' in ‡uencing e¤ort, the agents simultaneously choose the following strategies:
Having observed e 1 and e 2 the principal will make the implementation decision in the following way:
If e 1 > e 2 , then I ¤ (L) = 1:
If e 1 = e 2 , the principal randomizes,
Proof. For a proof see appendix 5.1.
The agents face a trade-o¤. The in ‡uencing e¤ort, e i , decreases their pay-o¤ but increases the chances that they will persuade the principal to make their favored decision I. Being a higher type results in higher in ‡uencing e¤ort as the pay-o¤ from persuading the principal (winning) increases. In equilibrium, the principal predicts this behavior and infers from e 1 > e 2 (e 1 < e 2 ) that £ 1 > £ 2 (£ 1 < £ 2 ). All costs are sunk at this stage, hence £ 1 > £ 2 (£ 1 < £ 2 ) implies a positive (negative) implementation decision. When e 1 = e 2 , the principal is indi¤erent about implementation.
The equilibrium requires that the principal can set the limit L credibly, and the agents will not ignore it. Credibility of the principal's commitment is indeed a problem in many settings where in ‡uence costs occur (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1995) . Ex ante commitment may not be credible for the principal if ex post there are some convincing arguments. Here, L represents a limit in terms of time or money the agents are given to conduct search and present their results. When the time is over, or the allowed budget is spent, the agents simply cannot search any further.
Proposition 1 allows us to analyze the optimization problem the principal faces in the …rst move when she chooses the limit L. The lower the limit L, the lower are the expected organizational in ‡uence costs but the less information is revealed and the lower is the expected MAS change value. The optimal limit maximizes the principal's expected pay-o¤: 
The function is increasing in L on the interval [0;
1 2 ]: Thus, the in ‡uencing e¤orts generate information bene…ts. We illustrate that with two extreme examples:
The notation E[(£ 1 ¡ £ 2 )1 A ] stands for the expectation taken over all pairs µ 1 ; µ 2 for which A is true.
The principal will not implement when e 1 < e 2 : She will infer that £ 1 < £ 2 and set I ¤ (L) = 0, by proposition 1. If L = 0, then e 1 = e 2 = 0; and the expectation is taken over all realizations of
, the principal can identify all the cases where µ 1 < µ 2 . This increases the expected MAS change value, because the pro…t will not be negatively a¤ected by them.
Knowing how the expected MAS change value and the expected organizational in ‡uence costs depend on L allows us to solve the principal's optimization problem (8) and to state the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The game of three players described in section 2.2 has a Baysian Nash equilibrium consisting of the following strategies:
(1) The principal imposes the optimal limit L ¤ and makes the adoption decision as follows:
(2) The agents and the principal play according to the strategies described in proposition 1.
Proof. The proposition largely summarizes the preceding paragraphs. The optimal adoption decision is straightforward. We omit the proof.
Before we look at the properties of this equilibrium, we consider a modi…cation of the game.
The case of completely informed agents
The previous section considered the case where the agents do not have better information than the principal about the opponent's type. When deciding on the optimal in ‡uencing e¤ort in the second move, they know only the distribution of £ i :
In practice, it is conceivable that the manager of one department knows more than the headquarters about the implications of a MAS change for another department.
Therefore, we also consider the complementary case of completely informed agents (who know both µ 1 and µ 2 ) in order to understand how the …ndings depend on the assumed information structure.
The game remains virtually the same. The only thing that changes is that, in the second move of the game, the agents simultaneously choose e 1 and e 2 knowing the opponent's type. Let µ h = maxfµ 1 ; µ 2 g and µ l = minfµ 1 ; µ 2 g, similarly for £ i and e i :
We can state the following proposition which parallels proposition 1:
Proposition 3 Given a limit L, the agents choose their strategies so that:
Having observed e 1 and e 2 the principal will make the implementation decision, I ¤ (L);
in the same way as described by proposition 1.
Proof. For the proof of the …rst part of the proposition see Che and Gale (1998) 6 .
The second part concerns the optimal implementation strategy. I ¤ (L) does not change because it still holds that:
which can be veri…ed by applying the results for the individual in ‡uencing strategies in Che and Gale (1998) .
The fact that the agents know their types forces them to randomize when the limit is su¢ciently high. For simplicity, we do not reproduce the individual mixed strategies, only their sum which is su¢cient to calculate the expected organizational in ‡uence costs.
The expected MAS change value is also di¤erent under the new information structure. Due to randomization, it may happen with a small probability that e 1 < e 2 (e 1 > e 2 ), although µ 1 > µ 2 (µ 1 < µ 2 ). As a result of that the information bene…ts from in ‡uencing decrease. We omit the explicit expressions for E[B(I ¤ (L))] and 6
There are multiple equilibria in the case L = : This occurs with zero probability and can be omitted in our framework. 
Implications for Adoption and Implementation
The previous sections derived the optimal trade-o¤ between costs and bene…ts of the in ‡uencing e¤ort. It can be used to generate insights about the e¤ect of centralization on the adoption and implementation of a MAS change. The optimal limit will depend on the degree of centralization. It will be denoted in this section as L ¤ (c) and in the case of complete information asL
Proposition 4 The expected value of a MAS change in centralized organizations will be lower than the expected value of the same MAS change in decentralized organizations.
Proof. Solving the optimization problem (8) yields the function L ¤ (c): It can easily be verifed that
< 0 (recall that the parameter c is high for centralized organizations). It follows from (9) that
This proposition points out an important …nding of this study. Organizational in ‡uence costs have both a direct and an indirect negative e¤ect. While the direct costs of in ‡uencing activities can be restricted, this will only be at the price of loosing information for the decision making process. The next proposition shows the implications for the adoption decision.
Proposition 5 Centralized organizations will optimally adopt less MAS changes than a decentralized organizations.
Proof. Take any two values of parameter c, (e.g.c for a centralized organization and c for a decentralized organization), such thatc > c: Let C A , the …xed costs of adoption, depend on the type of MAS change that is considered for adoption. It can easily be veri…ed that for all C A such that:
the following is true:
Consequently, A ¤ = 0 for the centralized organization and A ¤ = 1 for the decentralized organization.
Considering any particular MAS change, there is always some chance that C A is such that the change will be adopted in a decentralized organization but rejected in an organization with a higher degree of centralization. In other words, centralized organizations are less likely to adopt changes in their MAS.
Further, our analysis has implications for the implementation process. When e 1 6 = e 2 , the principal decides on implementation after having obtained all the relevant information from the agents. If e 1 = e 2 = L ¤ (c), the decision to implement is based on randomization. Such an implementation process can then be characterized as topdown because it does not re ‡ect the relevant information available at lower levels. It would be too costly to obtain it.
Proposition 6 Centralized organizations that adopt a change are more likely to implement it top-down, without obtaining all the information available at lower levels in the organization.
Proof. Denote p(c) the probability that e The conditional probability of implementation, given that adoption occurred, does not vary with the degree of centralization. What di¤ers is the way the implementation decision is made. In centralized organizations, it will frequently happen that MAS change is implemented top-down without knowing whether the bene…ts are higher than the costs of the MAS change.
Although we do not model the implementation stage explicitly (to avoid an overly complex setting), we can speculate under what conditions centralized organizations would be more likely to complete implementation once a MAS change was adopted (Gosselin, 1997) . Shifts in the environment can cause the agents' types, µ i ; to randomly change after the implementation decision (e.g. when a new pressing issue arises, the opportunity costs of MAS change increase). The equilibrium of this modi…ed game would closely parallel our results because all the parties are risk neutral. The di¤er-ence is that implementing MAS change with communication channels closed ignores signals about increased costs of MAS. It will happen less often that MAS change implementation is halted due to shifts in the environment. Thus, centralized organizations in a changing environment would be more likely to …nish implementation, once it started.
Discussion and Conclusions
Recent literature in organizational economics has addressed implications of in ‡uence costs for organizational design (see footnote 2). In this study, we have used these insights to look at the implications for an organizational change process. We have applied them to the process of management accounting change because it is a prime example of change involving two features central to the analysis: a decision-maker not informed about local information needs, and competition among the informed parties. This is due to the con ‡ict inherent in the functioning of MAS, given that it is used both for control and decision-making.
Our …ndings suggest that the adoption and implementation process of a MAS change will di¤er among organizations with di¤erent degrees of centralization. Optimal change process for centralized organizations encompasses two features. First, there will be a relatively high threshold that expected pro…t from MAS change has to meet. Below the threshold, change will not even be considered and no further information will be sought (i.e. project will not even reach the adoption stage). Second, top-down implementation will be relied upon more frequently, even though this may sometimes lead to implementation of an undesirable change.
There are also limitations to the generalizibility of our results. First, we have assumed that there are two organizational groups, one opposing, one supporting the change. We can expect that this will mostly be the case, but it is not di¢cult to imagine MAS changes that will not be too controversial. The key trade-o¤ analyzed in our framework would not apply to these cases.
The second limitation comes from the fact that the only means of information transmission in our analysis is competition between agents. Although Milgrom and Roberts (1992) suggested that "competition among interested parties with opposing interests may o¤er the best chance for all the relevant facts and desirable alternatives to be e¤ectively advocated", our conceptualization of such an information revelation might be too restrictive. We do not allow for the possibility that one of the parties …nds a crucial piece of information with little e¤ort. More (better) evidence can only be presented to the principal through more search e¤ort (m i (e i ) = e i ).
Notwithstanding these limitations, there are studies whose …ndings validate our results. Zaltman et al. (1973) present, and the innovation literature frequently apply, the "ambidextrous model" of innovation which suggests that low formalization and low centralization facilitate the initiation of innovations. The opposite structure is instrumental in the implementation stage. Gosselin (1997) found that the degree of centralization has a signi…cant e¤ect on what level of activity management is adopted and then implemented. In his study, he distinguishes less formal and less sophisticated levels (activity and cost driver analysis) and then the full formal ABC. Vertically di¤erentiated companies were found to adopt the full ABC system rather than the simpler activity analysis. Even more interestingly, when centralized organizations adopted ABC, they also went on with the implementation, while the decentralized organizations would often stop the implementation process at some activity analysis level (i.e., deviate from the original plan).
Our …ndings also shed some light on the developments in management accounting practices in the past. It has often been argued that management accounting is lagging behind developments in the production environment. Martinez and Jarillo (1989) provide evidence that the degree of centralization di¤ers across functional areas and that the …nance function is more centralized than other parts of the organization. Whether the same applies to MAS design still needs to be tested. But if the accounting department is more centralized than others, then it is in line with our theory that MAS are relatively rigid and it takes a major innovation such as ABC for changes to occur on a large scale.
Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1
First, we prove that I ¤ (L) as described in the proposition is optimal for the principal given that the agents' strategies are (7).
Given L; the principal will maximize E[U P (1; I)], her expected pay-o¤, when making the implementation decision: 
From (5) Knowing (7) and having observed e 1 > e 2 ; the principal can infer that £ 1 > £ 2 :
Consequently:
Equivalent argument yields that e 1 < e 2 implies I ¤ (L) = 0. Finally: e 1 = e 2 ) E[£ 1 ¡ £ 2 j e 1 (£ 1 ; L) = e 1 ; e 2 (£ 2 ; L) = e 2 ] = 0 ) E[U P (1; 1)] = E[U P (1; 0)]
The principal is indi¤erent and any randomization is possible. Yet, as we show below, only randomization with probability 1 2
can be maintained in the equilibrium.
Secondly, we prove that given I ¤ (L); the agents will …nd it optimal to choose the strategies as in (7). This part of the proposition was proved in a general form by La¤ont and Robert (1996) . Here, we present a simple proof for our speci…c case.
Without loss of generality we derive the optimal strategy of agent 1, given that (7) is optimal for agent 2. He maximizes his expected pay-o¤:
where P 1 (I ¤ (L) = 1) is the agent's interim probability of winning re ‡ecting his private information µ 1 . Given that e 1 2 [0; L] and agent 2 chooses his strategy in line with (7); we can specify the probability of winning:
P 1 (I ¤ (L) = 1) = P 1 (e 2 < e 1 ) + 1 2 P 1 (e 2 = e 1 = L) = P 1 ((£ 2 < p 2e 1 ) \ (£ 2 2L)) + 1 2 P 1 (£ 2 > 2L)1 e 1 =L :
The second expression on the right-hand side is the probability that both agents in ‡uence L and the principal randomizes, i.e. the agent has 
